Tape #4
Dave Richle interview
with
Jack Maloney

Maloney (inaudible) I didn't know Jimmy Bartlett, but I saw where he argued with a guy and it got pretty sharp. Now, the company would hire helpers out of a group of people that were assembled down there. It was like a shape up. And this day they hired a group and they assigned Whitey to me. Well, we'd worked together several places so that was a good arrangement. We got loaded and I said, "Whitey, what the hell was you arguing with that dude for?" And he said, "Oh, that's that Jimmy Bartlett, he's a real fink." And I said, "How come?" "Well," he said, "we expelled him from our party. I said, "Oh? For what?" Well, in between the time that I had last worked with Whitey or he had worked with me, whichever, the CWA/WPA had come into business. And Bartlett was out of work and he got a job as a laborer and a laborer's pay was $60.50 a month. That was a standard rate. Now, they had different rates for different areas in the country. The rate in Minneapolis for a laborer was $60.50. The woman's rate was a little bit less. She probably got $40 a month or something, $45. Well, it wasn't too long that now they had fellows that owned trucks. Some people got old trucks, they took old touring cars, cut the back end off them, made what we call a flip-flop dump, I think I explained that to you earlier, and eventually got enough money to get together to buy a hydraulic

dump. Well, Jimmy Bartlett knew a fellow who had a late model truck, a '31 or a '32 with a hydraulic dump on it, with a cab and everything. (inaudible) and the whole schmeer. But he had too much money to qualify to be on the WPA rolls. They hired people that owned their own equipment if they were within the norm of the WPA frame up. Whitey told me that Bartlett went to this guy and made a deal with him. "You sign your truck over to me and I in turn, will sign a chattel mortgage or proof of ownership back to you. And I can go to the WPA people and tell them I've got a truck now and I can get that hired on the WPA roll. And there ain't no work for your truck during the winter," because there wasn't much construction work. The guy done something with it during the summer, hauled gravel or worked with it some way. And you don't haul coal with it, so you'll make a few dollars a month, and besides that, the truck driver gets $20-25 a month more than a laborer. He said, "I'll drive the truck just for the $60.50, because I'll be sitting inside and it'll be warm" and so on. So that was going along fine until somebody blew the whistle and the Communist Party kicked him out of the Party for that reason, for opportunism or whatever. That's what he told me about Bartlett.

It never bothered me at all and I didn't think any more of it. I remember it. Well, about 1937, after we're back in the AF of L, well, before we got back into the AF of L, Sears Roebuck had a big store out on Lake Street and Elliot, big, big store. Montgomery Ward got a store over on Snelling and University about. They organized each of those stores respectively independently of one another but into the CIO clerk's union or something. Eventually, later on, much later, (inaudible) scabbed the St. Paul plant against the other Montgomery Wards stores. They were in the ~~IOWU~~ ILWU * CIO, I don't know where they was at the beginning, the real beginning, but later, when they merged into the ~~IOWU~~ ILWU, (inaudible) scabbed that store. I don't know if you know that.

BRIDGES (HARRY BRIDGES)

Riehle No.

Maloney He was the head of the ~~IOWU~~ ILWU. They had a lot of warehouses, the ~~IOWU~~ ILWU. They had a big march inland (?). Well, there was an organization of Sears workers who got a CIO charter. And/or a federal union charter, I'm not sure, I'm pretty sure it was a CIO union, it could have been a federal union. They didn't get off the ground. Nothing was happening. So they come down to the Teamsters. We were back in the AF of L by now, it was after September of '36, during the winter, early spring of '37 is when this

* INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION

incident occurred, in the spring of '37. Well, a guy by the name of Don Tibbetts, a nice guy, a pretty good stick, he was a smart one, and another redheaded kid, Ray, I think, but I can't remember his last name. They were in this Sears store and they were in the other union and they come down and wanted to know would the drivers take them in. And one way or another, there was no Taft Hartley, where you had to be out a year and then take a vote or anything, they just voted with there feet. They had a union hall over on Chicago Avenue, about the 2900 block, I can remember on the west side of the street, upstairs, we went there a couple of times, so they agreed to take them in the union and they go them a charter in the Teamsters, Local 359 I think it was, or 349, whichever. Still the same number today.

Well, in the meantime, Jimmy Bartlett has joined the ~~SWB~~ SWP*, I didn't know that. It wouldn't have made any difference if I knew it, but he joined them. Is that goddamned door open again?

So when the charter come through, who is the titled officer? The one with the rank is Jimmy Bartlett, Secretary/Treasurer, which is usually the number one post. Well, Tibbetts, I guess, was the president. Well, he--what did he know about the mechanics? He should have been the guy. Well, I got into a little chewing match

* SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

with Farrell later about when whatever about Bartlett, I said, "The guy's no good."

Well, I don't like to be playing that record, but I picked 3 or 4 of them phonies. I never said nothing to Farrell about Orrie Norton. Farrell told me about Orrie and I said, "I suspected that for a long time." But, anyway, Jimmy Bartlett winds up secretary/treasurer of the warehouse union. And the base of that union was Sears Roebuck.

Well, Sears ain't going to deal with him. No way but to go the back woods here and strike them. So they published a notice, Sears is going to be struck. Well, the pickets get up there at 5 o'clock in the morning, out on Lake Street, they're walking, and then night before Carl said, "You go out with Bartlett to Sears, you're going to have to have somebody with you." He said, "The idea is nobody gets in." I said, "Okay." And Harry and Emil and a couple more, so --Walt Hagstrom, all went different places. So they sent us to a door on Elliot Avenue, way down toward the loading dock. Now that was the first door the people come in. Harry and the other guys were on the other side. And that was just the way that the cookie crumbled, we could have been over there and they could have been here and the same thing would have happened.

Well, it turns out to be that Bartlett had got a new car, the union had bought a new car for him, it was 3-4 months old, brand new, and he was to be our driver, and there was Fritz Snyder and myself and Elmer Hanson and his brother George, and Swede Wesley. And the idea was nobody gets in. So about 5:30-6 o'clock, here comes a guy along, a nice day, he walks up and says, "Good morning." And we said, "Good morning," and we said, "where you going?" "I'm going in." "No, not today, partner. There's a strike on, nobody goes in." "Oh." He said, "Well, I don't work for Sears." And we said, "We don't care who you work for, you ain't going in. There's a strike on." He says, "Well, I work for Post Company" or somebody that had a concession to run the food stand. We said, "There ain't no use of you going and firing up the coffee pot because there's going to be nobody there to drink coffee. This store ain't going to open."

Well, one word led to another and, "Well, I'm not going to lose my job." Swede Weston said to him, "You'll lose your goddamned head." Swede was coming from Sweden, but he was a good head, and he had an accent. And he said, "you'll lose your goddamned head if you don't listen." Well, finally the guy said he didn't give a goddamn, he was going to go in. And we had a signal among

ourselves, we used the word acorn and that means that this guy had to get the business so that everybody knew what was coming. Somebody said, "This guy's an acorn." Well, that meant he had to be cracked or I guess Fritz let him have it, and Fritz was a hell of a fighter. He knocked the guy down and down he went and we kicked him and scuffled him around and he's moaning and groaning. By now we've got the attention of the cops. And they come. We looked around and Bartlett's gone. Well, we had to take it down to heel and toe the 4-5 of us, we weren't going to stay there and tell him the guy fell down, that ain't going to go, we'd go to the jailhouse. Bartlett's gone. Well, there's a depressed roadway for railroad trains about 29th Street, so we ran down there and them cops started to give us a little chase for a minute but the two of them figured, I guess, among themselves that there was 5 of them guys and we get down there and they'll dump us, they remembered what happened in Minneapolis in '34, you know. Well, they didn't chase us all the way and they didn't have any instructions to shoot, and we didn't quit running when they hollered, "Halt." And there just happened to be a freight train going by and it was going slow enough so we grabbed it, walked through in the boxcar and got on

the other side and it was a long drag and we walked down to Chicago Avenue and split up and went up to the union hall. And we stopped and ate, we went on independently, one or two together. And we got up to the hall about 9-9:30 and we walked in and Farrell said, "I thought you guys were on the picket line this morning?" And I said, "We were, but," I said, "we had a little ruckus out there. You didn't expect us to stay there and introduce ourselves to the cops, did you?" "Oh, no, no, no." And I said, "Your fine-feathered friend there run off and left us." "What do you mean?" And I told him what Bartlett did.

And I told Farrell the story of him getting drummed out of the Commie Party and Farrell told me I didn't have the right to put a black mark behind the guy's name. And I said, "All right, we'll wait and see." Well, that was Bartlett. I never liked the man and I never had nothing to do with him. Well, you know the ~~roll he~~ role played in the trial?

Now, the other interesting thing is that when Bartlett went on to fame, to become the federal mediator, to become the chief stoolpigeon, the guy who come in and got in charge of that union is Jack Jorgenson.

Riehle Of 359?

Maloney Yes. Now he arrived there about that time and he came from Enderlin, North Dakota, a farm boy, and in his history he gave his history, he had never worked under union place before and he came in there and he aced himself into the leadership of that union. In very short order.

So when Bartlett then goes on to become a federal mediator, and I guess he's dead now, 20-30 years too late, the son of a bitch, Jack Jorgenson just winds his way up the line like nobody's business. And he becomes the secretary/treasurer of Local 359.

When the smoke clears away in Local 544, now this is after a series of events Sid Brennan rises to power and fame. Tommy Williams' brother, Gene Williams, coasting on Tommy's martyred name, he becomes a business rep for the union. And another guy, who's a professional--some sort of bullshit artist, calls himself a hoodlum, sold himself to the union that he was a big, tough bastard by the name of Connolly. This is before 1955. And a few short years in there, there wasn't too many years. Jorgenson and Brennan and Williams get mixed up with Archer Daniels Midland. Archer Daniels Midland was struck. I think the miners or somebody had struck them, they were on strike quite a while. And I don't remember all the detail, but they worked out a deal with the

Teamsters and Brennan and Jorgenson and Connolly shook that company down or they got $10,000 or $5,000 apiece, if they admit it, and I know they got more, and broke that strike. They brought people in there or signed an agreement or put people in there to go to work. This other union got into the act, was off the case to bear, and exposed them. And Brennan and Jorgenson and Connolly and Williams got convicted. In the meantime, Sid Brennan, for his rotten role in 544 had been elevated by Tobin to a vice presidency job in the Teamster's union. He got convicted and Tobin had to remove Brennan as a vice president of the international union. That was the first man that I ever heard that was removed as a vice president of the Teamster's union. Billy ~~McCarty~~ McCARTHY * may have removed Morris Sherwood, if he hasn't already done it. He's moving to do it. But Tobin had to remove Sid Brennan and kick him out of official office in the union. He never retained office. Gene Williams got a kick upstairs, he couldn't hold office again and he got in some sort of a shitty assed saloon or bar or something, some shakedown, skin game, pimping deal or something. Connolly took it on the lam. Jorgenson, who also got convicted went on to an illustrious career in the Teamsters and he wound up and retired as

* INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT OF IBT IN 1998.

president of the Joint Council with about $100,000 a year. For years he's been getting that. Now what does that tell you?

And this all follows in this routine with Bartlett, the whole schmeer. Now all of this stuff is documented. There ain't a word that I'm telling you that ain't true.

And Jorgenson never done a goddamned thing in his life, so he's got to be a protégé of the FBI. And he ran the Teamster's Union, everything in the state of Minnesota, and the influence that he could put around there through the joint council, he was it. Tobin had to remove Brennan. Why didn't he remove Jorgenson? They both got convicted. They were both officers of the Teamster's Union. They were both foreclosed from holding office for 5 years after that conviction, didn't bother Jorgenson. He kept right on going. You see the Jackie Presser case here, was he or not an informant?

Riehle So Brennan didn't get back in the Teamsters in any capacity?

Maloney I don't think so. He went out and he started up a company on his own, he called it the North Shore Rigging Company or North Star Rigging Company. And he got involved in all sorts of graft there and scandal too. And he's dead now. He died here oh within the last 10 but I think more likely within the last 7 or 8 years. But he

never got back in office in the Teamster's Union. He became an employer and he started this rigging company. He was getting government contracts. And they were big contracts. And he was a dude, you know. He never worked in the industry much. Before the 1934 strike, he worked at the American Electrotype or something. Now you said your dad was at Brenner and you've been around the trade and you know that how the industry has changed from what it used to be. When they had the hot lead and the photoengravers and the mats they used to make, quality shops used to do that work. They were depending on the photoengraver and they were depending on this and they were depending on that. So all these little shops had drivers. They had little small vans, they didn't have need for a big truck, but they had vans or little pickups, but we stopped at this goddamned Brennan a couple of times and he said, "Well, I work in this (inaudible) and I just had an emergency." He didn't belong in the union before the strike. I don't remember him and I don't think that was one of the companies that we voted during the strike. I'd have to look at my records then. After '34, I don't know where he went to work. Now, he had a brother that worked for Gamble Robb. Jack. And Jack wasn't too bad a guy, except that he was a heavy drinker and a kind

of a bully. Well, they had a family farm up in Pine River, north of Minneapolis by--I think it's Pine River, up there by Chisago up in there someplace.

Riehle Pine City?

Maloney Pine City. In there. Well, they went up there one weekend and they were drinking and they started to bully some farmer and the farmer wasn't going to take it and he pulled out--he went out and got a ~~shoots~~ shot gun and he shot the hell out of Jack Brennan and killed him. He should have got Sid. But Jack was--when he was sober he was a nice guy. He was in the union all the way, right from the very beginning, but I never remember Sid. But Jack got killed, oh, I don't know when that was now, but he got killed on a weekend bully trip. He would have fit --when he was drinking, he'd have fit in one of them motorcycle squads, he belonged in that kind of--when he was drinking he had that kind of a ideology. And they started to bulldoze some farmer and the farmer went in and got his shotgun or rifle and killed him. And the other guy, when he shot him, they took off, they didn't want seconds, and the beat it.

But Sid went on to become, I think that he was the architect behind Tommy Williams. I think that he's the guy that might have got --

laid the groundwork for Tommy. They knew about Tommy. They had to be--you didn't find nothing in the records on Tommy?

Riehle Oh, yes, there was some.

Maloney Is there much? When is the date?

Riehle That he died?

Maloney No, no, when do the records start on him?

Riehle Well, this one here is 1940.

Maloney Oh, that's when he got mixed up there. They didn't have any previous history on him.

Riehle Not at (inaudible)

Maloney Well, I don't think Tommy was mixed up with anything except his own little world until he saw what was available in the union. It was so much bigger than the cab drivers. And it was there for the taking. And I'll have to look up Mickey's letter and --it isn't all that particular but I know what it was. He was around shaking down the bosses, you know? That's what they charged him with and that's what they expelled him with. And I guess the time that he died, dropped dead of a heart attack, they were going to have a meeting and they were going to produce the goods on him, and the meeting hall was on the third floor at 257, and they tell me that he was on

his way in there and heart stopped. And he collapsed and that was it.

But he was primed up to that, too, because I don't think-- he was a cunning, crafty little bastard, but I don't think that he had the long-range planning that Sid Brennan did. And Sid Brennan was a schemer. And he was being coached. But Sid Brennan, I don't think--I tell you, Dave, I don't remember him in the union until after we got into the AF of L. I don't remember seeing him or nothing. And I had a pretty good knowledge of the guys. Now, I wasn't picked to be an observer judge for any other reason except that I knew the people. I bounced around in that industry for 8 years about 7 of them in the union. And I know pretty much the guys that were in the industry. Because most of the guys didn't come to the union in 574 until April or May of '34. But I knew where the guys worked and how did I know it? You were making deliveries, you were down at the freight houses, you were down at the team tracks, you were at the express offices. That's what truck drivers do. And you see guys there. Now I don't know what your job is as a switchman or a brakeman, but I assume that after you're around them switch yards, train yards, you get to know people. You see them, you observe them. You identify them. Well, that's the

way it goes. So--and now I don't want you to think that I knew every person that worked for 166 companies. Because in them 166 companies was a few little mom and pop outfits as we called them. We didn't call them real mom and pops, but like Loring Transfer, that guy in there, Roy Evers. He had 3 or 4 trucks, sometimes he drove one of them when there was not much work for his firm. He had Loring Transfer. He was mostly in household goods moving. All them apartment houses up on Grant Street and Nicollet and Loring and around Loring Park. That's where he got his name, Loring Transfer. But when there was work he picked up drivers from the Citizen's Alliance, from the M&St. L, or from wherever--he'd call them at home if he knew they had a phone. His roster of people was a hard one to decide. But the companies that had steady people working I knew pretty near every one of them and where they worked. And we challenged them and even if we knew they worked and we knew they was a fink, we'd say, "That son of a bitch is a ringer." He didn't work there, never saw him before. Put him in the challenge box, because that's what they were doing to us, because if you know a guy is an enemy vote you won't let him get by without a challenge, are you? So I challenged a lot of them. I knew that they were finks and we just challenged them. But we didn't

have all that many challenges either. It was a surprisingly small number. A couple of hundred, maybe. But we fought every one out. But I never knew Sid Brennan to be in the union. I can't place him until around--after we got back in the AF of L and that's the fall of '36. The first time I remember seeing him around the union hall. But it's an interesting career story. He was a vice president of the international. Jack Jorgenson was the secretary/treasurer of 359. They were on the identical bead, both officers, and to my knowledge Jorgenson never gave up doodly squat. What does that tell you? Everybody else that I know that was convicted of a felony or anything that they considered a violation had to be removed from office for 5 years.

We had a guy in our union, a member of the executive board, he was on the labor relations committee. He was involved in stealing and he got convicted and they had to pull him off. Caught him stealing. Interstate Commerce. Christ almighty, when you said stealing, it used to be in the old days, the longshoreman who didn't steal didn't have a hook in his pocket. The married man's bundle, that was part of your payday, for God's sake. And Lindsey, Bob Lindsey, he was an officer of the union, out, and for 5 years. How did Jorgenson get by with it? How did he fit in right with Bartlett

and the whole smear? How did he rise so fast in that union? Who propelled him, a farm boy from North Dakota who come to work at Sears? How he gets the job and how he gets pushed ahead.

[end side A, begin side B]

Riehle This is October 20, 1988, discussion with Shaun Maloney on the organization of the area committees in the Teamsters.

Maloney Well, the organization of the area committee is a tremendous or immense subject. And it has to be dealt with in stages. The first stage would be the initial outline by Carl Skoglund in approximately the winter of 1930.

The next part, and that would follow then for a period of probably a year to a year and a half, there would be intermittent discussions and further development on ideas. And these ideas were not just the handwork or the brain work of Carl. Carl told me and in other places he admits that he and Ray Dunn, whom he associated with very closely, and Jim Cannon had been discussing this from the very early days of the Communist League, and perhaps even in their days of the last days of their life in the Communist Party.

The second stage of the development of the area committee is kind of a short lived one, and it would deal with a period after the settling of the 1934 strikes and the expulsion of 574 from the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters. And then the unique period during the time that 574 was outside the Teamster's Union and operating as an independent union seeking reinstatement into the Brotherhood of Teamsters.

The next period, then, would deal with the developments that occurred, commencing with the meeting in the late summer and very early fall in Cloquet, Minnesota. The date we can verify, but I would estimate it to be August or September of 1936. And the meeting in January of 1937, where the north central district driver's council was formally established. And that period would cover almost to the day one year, when John Pecago, acting on the instructions of Daniel Tobin, then general president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, read a letter to the first annual meeting of the North Central District Driver's Council assembled at the headquarters of 120, St. Paul, Minnesota, the letter in substance said that the Council would be dissolved, all efforts to maintain it would have to be abandoned, and no future organization of this type would be tolerated by Tobin or the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Immediately a committee was dispatched to Indianapolis to wait on Brother Tobin, to present our resentment at his action, and demand

that we be allowed to continue what we were doing and there was a group of about 10 of us, Carl Dobbs was the spokesperson. And I believe everyone had an ax to grind and did a pretty fair job of taking Tobin on and bringing him up to date on the change in the industry. And that the industry was changing.

Riehle What was his demeanor at this meeting? Was he interested or hostile or what?

Maloney Tobin was a little piqued. Piqued, when we first come in. He felt that we had the effrontery to come and challenge his decision. He was a little--I don't want to say bewildered, but he was a little --not bewitched either, but he was a little I think curious on why--he had never really faced this kind of an onslaught before. Where a group, a composite group of people representing local unions from 4 or 5 states covering a good section of the country came to him and literally, in effect, challenging his decision to abolish our council. At one point, I don't remember if he actually used the word, but certainly the allegation was there that he was very suspicious that we were not building a dual union.

Now there was-- this was in January 8th or 10th of 1938. And from the summer of 1936, it is my considered opinion that Tobin had

been relying on Pat Corcoran to give him, shall we say, the lay of the land, and what was coming down.

Now, with Pat being assassinated in November of '37, and I'm quite sure that there were people who had advised Tobin that now that his ace in the hole, or the right hand bower, Corcoran, was gone he'd better watch them wolves from the west or the north, as they referred to us. And I can name the people that were putting such thoughts in his head. One was a general organizer, Henry Berger, of Chicago. John Pecago, a much junior general organizer, of Milwaukee, Local 200. Now, Berger had a long history with Tobin and Tobin had some loyalty to Burger, even when Burger had misjudgments, because Burger was mixed up in the fights in the earlier '30s, when Tobin was trying to do away with or take over what was known, well, for the use of a better word, the Chicago Brotherhood of Teamsters. There were 2 or 3 local unions in Chicago, who were not members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. And in the--I don't recall exactly when that thing started, 1930 perhaps, '31 I know. I could check the date, but I think it was around '31 or '32, and the fight was on with the ice and coal drivers, I think the local number was 703, Chicago Teamsters. The fighting got pretty heavy and fighting in Chicago at that time

Paddy

meant bombing and shooting. And ~~Patty~~ Burrell, Patrick Burrell, B-U-R-R-E-L-L, was shot and killed. And Burger himself was shot and remained a cripple. He walked with a cane. He had a bad hip, he was shot in the hip area, and he had difficulty in walking, and most of the times when he went in certain areas, Tobin provided him with a bodyguard. Tobin got 2 or 3 Reo cars, Reo made a sedan. And that were Flying Clouds, that was the number one car. And the reports were that he'd fixed them up with some kind of armor plate in the metal and bulletproof glass or its equal in the glass area. And he had certain of the larger group of people, I mean the higher office people in Chicago, that was their cars. And at 220 So. Ashland, which was the headquarters of the Chicago Brotherhood--I mean the International Brotherhood of Teamsters at the time, they rented houses across the street, or purchased them, whichever, and they had people there during the working hours of the day, guards with rifles, with sights on them, and constant communication, immediate in the event anyone tried to pull any caper, tried to break in the union hall. And these guys were to pick them off if there was any problem.

Well, there's two schools of thought on who the people were. Some say it was the Capone mob that were in charge of these unions, and

the more learned group contends it was the Toohey gang. And I'm inclined to believe it was the West Side Irish, which Roger and his brother, Jake, were Irish, and they had their offices on West Madison Street between Halsted and on about Sangamon. Not too far away from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. And the story was that they said that they don't sleep in them cars, we'll get them when they come out, and that's what they did. They shot up Burger and his wife, they were going to attend a rosary, and Burger's wife got pretty badly lacerated. And I don't know if it was the same time now, I think it was a different occasion, they shot and killed ~~Patty~~ Daddy Burrell. So Tobin had some reason to believe people when they would come to him and tell him now look, people might be trying to take us over. People might be trying to build another union.

Now, I'm not here trying to write a brief for Tobin, I'm trying to say that some of the fears that might have been going on in Tobin's mind, why he was so fearful.

Then there was another factor, earlier in Ohio there had been some efforts made by certain of the driver's unions, with certain building contractors, largely those in the aggregate field, that is sand and gravel, to control prices. And control the jobs and those that were

contrary to the scheme of things that would have difficulty getting rock, cement, sand, or gravel. And the Teamsters union had some problems with that, which Tobin didn't like and was very frightful of. And there was also an effort made in Toledo and in Cleveland with certain officials, individuals, but acting in concert, trying to establish, I believe it was--as I recall hearing about it, certain contracts for hauling for certain trucking employers. And there was some court action threatened or in fact, and Tobin was very fearful of getting the union involved in those kind of things and he was really frightened, therefore, of what we were trying to do. And I suspect that he felt maybe that now he has no Pat Corcoran around to blow the whistle if things got haywire. There was no pop valve there to protect the boiler if anything got too strong. So the best thing for him to do was to dissolve the whole thing.

Now, actually, I may be wandering from your question, Dave, we were, in fact, planning and had the plans laid, to assess the members on a pro rata basis for their members certain costs for certain sections of their members, that is the highway drivers would pay a certain amount of money per month, cents per month per member to help finance the highway organizers. And a general per capita of a few pennies a month for all hands to establish and

maintain the structure and a central office and some degree of coordination. So from Tobin's standpoint, looking at it without having it explained to him, there was grounds for him to be fearful that we were setting up a little group that soon could say, "By your leave, Mr. Tobin, we're in business and to hell with you." And he was a very suspicious and a very canny person. And he did not survive all the efforts and all the connivery and all the things that happened over the years that he was general president without some degree of effort by people to run some wizards (whizzers?) on him.

[interruption in tape]

Now, I may have wandered away from the question in point, was he surprised or perturbed that we were there. I think he was. And I think he was doubly surprised that we come in organized to challenge his decisions. Previously, in the past, previously, Tobin had ordered a fellow or a member of the union or an officer or two or maybe the entire set of officers to do something, well, they done it. And he had enough clout, power, or he instructed the joint council or sent out one of his organizers and his power of threatening to jerk charters and revoke charters and discipline people (inaudible) for him. And so when we come in and sat down

and told him that, Farrell did, that we were disturbed about his decision, that we felt that he may have had grounds for doing what he did, but Farrell told him that he thought if he understood all the facts that were involved that he may have a different opinion. And different members of the various unions said what had to be done. The world was changing. That their low lines, their freight terminals were being high graded, they were being bypassed. Their local cartage drivers were being bypassed, the freight driver was picking freight up in St. Louis and delivering it directly to the door in Detroit or in Milwaukee or wherever, that was the way it was going, and we were concerned that before long the cartage driver as we knew him would be just a thing of the past and that we had to move with the industry.

Well, it was these kinds of things from various people and some were heated. Some guys were hot and spoke with more enthusiasm and with less scientific approach than Farrell. And some were more direct and blunt, but Tobin began to get the idea that maybe there was some merit in what was being said. I have that conclusion. And Farrell was pointing out to him--Farrell did a very good job. He started to point out to him that from the days that he drove a team and went to the team track and took out a load of freight and

had the freight checker seal the car and he spent a half a day going to the warehouse to deliver it and getting back and loaded up and went again, that that kind of work was on the drawing boards to be emasculated. That was out. That more and more we were finding that what was happening and Farrell related the trap car situation that we had in Minneapolis and specifically he pointed out that prior to the strike in '34 the various cartage companies, transfer teaming companies, would send a wagon, a dray, a truck, whatever, to the shipper's warehouse and load that cargo for one of the various rail depots. And when all of that country shipping was loaded, the driver would take the bills and drive to the depot, take his place in line, back up, and hand check, hand count each piece as it went out. And there were 2 freight handlers, a checker and a handler, and the driver involved. And that as long as the cartage company didn't have to worry about wages for the driver the teaming craft people weren't concerned. But when the strike was over and the drivers were getting paid 52 1/2 cents per hour for every hour they worked, there was no overtime, after 8 they were getting paid 52 1/2 cents an hour. Overtime after 48. The reason for that was that you usually didn't get started early enough in the

morning to have 8 hours of work by 5 o'clock at night, we were on the productive hour yet.

So they started looking for ways to get around the wages and they developed a thing called the trap car. They would bring a wagon or a semi trailer, put it at the door of the shipper, and all day long the warehouse employees of that particular shipper, when they had anything, they'd just put it in this trap car and they'd put the bills for whatever railroad was involved, and they had little boxes or spindles for whatever railroad, 7 or 8 of them. When they got that loaded, they'd whistle up the trucking company, who'd send down a tractor or send down a span of horses, and haul it over to a depot which was a trap car station and then they'd split it out and load it that way and the trucking companies were getting cut out of the work. And Farrell pointed to this as can be and probably will be a pattern in the future. And the cross-town freight that we used to know, we're getting tuned out of that. The team ~~drak~~ track and the freight house freight that we used to pick up at the railroad siding or at the freight house is now picked up at the point of origin, where it's manufactured, hauled in by truck to where it's going to be used. The only people that get their hands on it are the warehouse employees of the company that's using it or going to sell it.

Well, after awhile, Tobin started to ask more questions. How did we propose to deal with it? And what would we do to bring this all about? Well, Farrell, of course, had been through this time and time again with Carl, with Ray, with the various people that were involved in the organization of the joint council--I mean the North Central District Driver's Council, the state driver's council. So he was able to give Tobin a good, straightforward, reasonable explanation on every question that Tobin pounded to him. Farrell had a practical working example and many times used an example, pointing out that "Look, this is what's happened, we're doing this." "Well, how do you propose to prevent it?" And Farrell said, "Well, nothing is certain, not even in medicine, but if we establish the same rate of pay under the same set of working conditions with the same manning scales, it's quite likely that there will be no incentive to chisel because no one will have a privilege to go someplace else and get a deal. And that's what it's all about," or words to that effect.

I think we broke for lunch or coffee or something and we come back and we continued on. And then Tobin give us the speech, he was aware of what was happening in the union and he knew that the big bakeries were starting to expand and that they were building

smaller bakeries and this, that, and the other. That the big creameries--he was more well versed in the creamery side than in any, because they were (inaudible) and he'd no doubt been talking to some of the heads in the creamery driver's union, Pat Corcoran was one, but there were others, and he pointed out that he knew this was happening and that--but Farrell countered, Farrell said, "Yes, that's true, but the creamery driver is still and for all intents and purposes is still a local person. The milk wagon driver in St. Louis is not competing with the milk wagon driver in St. Paul. The distance is too great, the conditions are too far apart. The freight driver can easily pick up a load of freight in St. Louis on one day and a day or two later deliver it in St. Paul. And if St. Paul has good working conditions, he can go in and violate their good conditions by refusing to employ any of them. On the other hand, if there are good working relations and conditions in St. Louis, he can go direct to this plan and pick it up and violate the good and established working conditions in St. Louis because he backs the truck up to the plant, the local cartage driver, the local transfer company is not involved, and this alien, foreigner insofar as business is concerned, his truck is in there, he's doing the work with less men and for less money. Part of getting the haul is shortchanging the local cartage

worker. That's figured in the haul. So anyway that you look at this, someone pays on either end and many times on both ends if we allow this to continue."

Well, I can't recall everything that was said, but finally Tobin said that the council that we had established, the pattern that we had, he simply could not allow. And I thought he was getting ready to tell us to go back to our locals, forget this, pay our good honest tax, and go to church in the morning. However, he said, "I believe there is some merit in what you say," or words to that effect. "And I will allow this committee to go ahead and organize only the loader freight drivers." Now, we didn't interrogate him about the city pickup and delivery people, we didn't want to get into that. Because that's an integral part of the operation. He didn't understand that that's a big part and we didn't say anything because what we'd been talking about was the road driver coming in and eliminating the city pickup and delivery driver. Or going to the place and picking it up and not utilizing it.

But he said it must be just confined to that. And what Tobin had in the back of his mind, I'm sure that he was building an argument to give to these Teamster joint council kinds what he did. He was protecting their domain. This was work that was protecting them,

and that was where we'd go. But mind you, now, they're not to try to bring in anything else, it's supposed to be strictly motor freight. And, of course, we assured him, Farrell did, that's all. "That's fine, Brother Tobin," he said, "that's good enough for us. We're convinced that if we can get the motor freight straightened around why it will protect all the unions on either end and it will protect the industry."

So he told us that we could continue on a provisional basis, subject to his judgment, the organization of the motor freight drivers, provided we done it within the rules of the international and didn't step over and start to line up everybody.

I believe that was the short synopsis of that day in Indianapolis. When we come out of the meeting and Farrell and I were in a cab going to the hotel, Farrell said to me, "Jack, what do you think?" I said, "Farrell, I don't think the old son of a bitch knows what he gave us." And I don't think he did.

Now, we were criticized by a lot of people why we didn't do more than we did in other areas. And we wrote the language, the contract, and everything else strictly in the name of the over-the-road motor freight agreement. All of that was cold-blooded. We could have had fancy names, we could have developed a probably a

more romantic or charismatic name, but we wanted it exactly the way that Tobin said we could go. Over-the-road motor freight is what we were organized as. Tobin had had no experience in this field. And he thought it was something I know that he could explain away to his chieftains, the Teamster Joint Council heads, you're giving away our jurisdiction. He could say, "No, we never had that before. Who's got these motor freight drivers? Where are they?" Nobody had them, nobody had them under contract at least. If they were collecting dues from them they were shaking them down. So that's the way he looked at it. And he didn't know when we walked out of that office what he'd license he'd given us to do. Two or three on the committee knew, four-five maybe, all of them, I'm sure didn't.

I think there were some that were disappointed that we didn't go farther or some of the people that I met in various local unions, "Why in the hell didn't we get it for the bakery drivers and the milk wagon and the coal haulers?" Because we'd been emphasizing you know all of these guys roll the ball together, the coal drivers will have a minimum set, the laundry drivers and the milk wagons and the bakeries and so on. But we had talked among ourselves. Carl and Ray had talked among ourselves that even if you had the linen

drivers in Duluth and the linen drivers in Minneapolis you never had the same intermingling of work and relationship that you did between the freight drivers in the two cities. It just wasn't there. The retail bread sales, the Duluth bakery driver wasn't bumping into Minneapolis, you didn't see him stocking shelves in Minneapolis and vice versa. But you saw the guy from Duluth backing his rig into the platform in Minneapolis every goddamned morning, and vice versa.

So we among ourselves were convinced that we were on the right track. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. We proved it. Now, gradually, after a long period of time, I believe there were others that come to realize that the thinking was correct, that those people I think were doubting Thomases and they may have said, "Oh, those guys lucked out, it wasn't planned that way." But the whole theory was planned, wasn't planned by me and it wasn't planned by Farrell, but the structure, the basic structure was thought out, conceived--I'm never going to change on it. Other people can come and convince somebody else, they'll never change my mind, Carl and Ray and no doubt Jim ~~Gannon~~ CANNON, maybe Marty Abern, he was in the transportation industry too.

Riehle Who?

Maloney Who? Marty Abern.* He was a freight clerk on the Minnesota Transfer Railway. He worked there, so he was a little familiar with boxes and barrels. I don't know how familiar, but that was supposed to be his origin, unless my spies didn't give me the right report on him.

Now I don't want to jump the gun on this, but that was January 10, 1938. I don't think that Tobin figured, and quite frankly I don't think that Dobbs or myself or Jack Worth or

[end tape 4]

* MARTIN ABERN, LEADER OF THE SWP in 1930's.

Tape #5

Dave Riehle interview

with

Jack Maloney

Maloney I believe we were talking that we met with Tobin in January of '38, and we were ready to sign a negotiated agreement. In the last days of August, I believe, in --I'm going to check here and see the exact date, it could have been the 26th, it could have been the 28th--huh, wrong on both counts, it was the 23rd.

Well, as soon as we got the final language drafted and an agreement that it would be typed and the press release ready, and have I given you a copy of that?

Riehle The press release?

Maloney The final draft? Well, I'll dig that out of my junk and pass that on to you. The culmination of the thing, Farrell called Tobin and told him that we'd reached an agreement satisfactory to both committees, and that we'd withhold the signing of it until he could come up and wanted to offer him the opportunity to lead the signatures for the union.

Riehle In Chicago?

Maloney What?

Riehle In Chicago?

Maloney In Chicago. It's only a couple-three hours on the (inaudible) Railroad to come up there. Tobin had a thing about airplanes. Well, he thanked Farrell, he used to call him ~~Foul~~ "FAARELL"* (?), "Well, you'll

* WITH A LONG "A" - IRISH BROGUE

hear from me, Farrell. I'll" -- so pretty soon Farrell gets a note and he just couldn't find it in his schedule to make it, "But I'll send Tom Hughes up."

Now he could have left and come up, his schedule wasn't that important, but that's how canny he was. He didn't want to get on a dud. So he sends up the secretary/treasurer, Tom Hughes, whose signature -- by all means we didn't want to have no lesser light than the International to lead that agreement, we wanted to tie them into it. We didn't want to have no independent--oh, there was consensus in the meeting, the hell with the international, they weren't for us in the beginning, why clue them in now? Farrell prevailed and he said, "No, International is going to sign this agreement first and we'll follow." And up come Tom Hughes. Tom Hughes signed it and everything is eggs in the coffee. Now, a year later and a couple of three hundred thousand members more and all kinds of success and the next agreement is ready for signature. And when Tobin gets the call that the agreement is ready for signature, he's johnny on the spot. And you take a look at the signatures in the agreement. Farrell and I laughed to beat hell about it. Tobin will be there for the second one, but he wasn't quite sure yet, really about if he should risk his name, because if he put

his name on that agreement and it fizzled out he wasn't going to have Dan Tobin's name attached to a boomer. So it's all right and he stuck--well, he had another ace in the hole, he could have sent John Galisty, but he sent Tom Hughes, he was the secretary/treasurer.

So on the second agreement, however, when the amount of men directly covered under the agreement had just about doubled when we stretched the coverage of the agreement by the contiguous territory shop and the operating into and out of theory on lines, we'd increased tremendously the extent and the coverage of the agreement, and that brought in damn near double the amount of men that were covered directly. And that doesn't mean all the other indirect people that went with the agreement, a lot of indirect people. And here we're not talking about the trickle down that goes, because as the line drivers in the communities started blossoming out with the big paychecks and the better work week, and they get talking to their friends and fellow workers, the power, the prestige of the Teamsters union, that's what you could get for belonging to the union, that was the advertising that blew that union into prominence. It wasn't just somebody going out and beating the drum. The theory is that if one man can organize 10, 10 men can

organize 100. And it's never more true than when you get a good contract, a good set of conditions, and security on the job.

A lot of workers who never done a damn thing to achieve those conditions inadvertently, I find, become your best salesmen, because they start bragging about what they've got and they don't know what they're doing, but they're hyping up the unions. They don't mean to do it, because they don't know what it's all about, but they are your salespersons.

Now that wandered away quite a bit, but there is another factor that deals with the problem of the area committee, and I touched a little bit on it and maybe right now, time and circumstance it might be well to fit it in.

And that's the problem that we had after Tobin in the middle of January gave us the right to organize the motor freight drivers only. We had to go back and tell everybody that all was not lost. Well, what can we do? Well, we couldn't tell the guys, "Well, look, fellas, we ain't going to pay no attention to Tobin, we're going to go beyond what he told us." So we said we were going to go and organize the motor freight drivers. But we'll still continue to organize under the constitution of the Teamsters all the other drivers and we'll bargain and do like we did. And wherever it's

possible that the motor freight drivers are involved, they'll be in the motor freight end of it.

Now, there was a thing that Tobin wasn't aware of when we talked. Now, we were talking with him in January of 1938, and the industry had been regulated in the summer of '35. Prior to that it was anybody's ballgame. When the motor freight industry was regulated, then those people who were in the industry and could prove they were in it and had been under the street expression "grandfathred in," they were in the business of consolidating what they had and trying to chisel as much as they could before they got stopped to got a bigger piece of the pie. And trying to solidify what they had and the country was just emerging from that terrible Depression period. A lot of these truck lines were not wealthy. They were operating on a day-to-day basis and an hour-to-hour basis, tank-by-tank gasoline basis a lot of them. So capital outlay was a big thing with them. And they had old plunk trucks, they had big old heavy sled trailers, we used to call them sleds, dragging them up and down the road. And the coincidental with the regulation of the industry for the motor freight drivers in many states now the activity of the highway departments started accelerating. The railroad lobbies went to work, they were going to

make it as hard as they could on truck lines, they were shortening up the length of the truck. They were putting in laws that you had to stop at all grade crossings. They were eliminating sets or the double bottoms, trucks couldn't haul a trailer behind them. And they were--the railroad lobbies were out to harass the trucking companies and many of the trucking companies had all they could do to keep going with what they had. And they had to consolidate and regroup and there was not a lot of money around because I think the expression in the banking circles is called venture capital. These guys didn't have a big, long, extensive, and successful operating--business operating record and venture capital, as we know it today, I think was very, very much more hard to come by than it has been in other periods of time.

So the trucking companies were between the rock and the ~~hog's pod~~ hard place (?). They had the railroad lobbies going after them for all sorts of things, harassing them on their operations, and the railroad lobbies, no doubt, were behind some of the state's activity to institute more drastic, more difficult, more hamstringing laws, shorten up the length of the rigs, cut down the weight, slow down the speed. They passed laws that trucks of a certain weight couldn't operate on class

A roads within 35 miles of primary cities. I don't know if you ever knew that.

Well, they had all of those laws. Minneapolis and St. Paul as primary roads, you couldn't operate--they were putting in all this harassment of the trucks. So the truckers, as they liked to call themselves, up until the passage of the motor state--I mean the regulated industry, the trucking associations that they had were the outshoots of the old trade associations, that were more or less local groups and their primary purpose, as far as I was ever able to determine at that time, they'd band together to beat the union down, that was their common cause. Otherwise they were kind of a do-good group and they weren't organized to do what the trucking associations, as we know them today, do for the industry. They hadn't got into that sophisticated association. Although the American trucking association was in existence. And it, too, was a super political group, and a lot of the smaller trucking companies that had proved their right to operate were still small companies operating on a limited budget, or no budget, and having a hard time to make it.

Now, I'm not writing a brief for them to be little people, but you have to understand what the situation was with many of these

companies. They weren't the wealthy tycoons that some of them have developed into today, 50 years later. And in the big, major cities, there was established one or two groups of dominant people in the cartage industries, and they were called transfer men, cartage men, draymen's association, whatever, they had different names. And they'd band together and do certain things, but mostly they would have one common cause, and that was they'd really get their act together when the union got around. Outside of that, they were kind of secretive about what they done. Of what I can remember of them.

So we were moving now into Chicago and we decided that that would be the center of operations. That's the hub. And we were sure--and we had talked about this long before, we talked about this when we were in the stage between being expelled and being readmitted, that without Chicago, which was the center, we'd have a difficult, difficult way to go. And we agreed that we would concentrate on the city of Chicago. And that presented a lot of problems. And many of the truck lines that we wanted to deal with did not have their home offices in Chicago, they had them outside of Chicago, they were in smaller cities and they were running into and out of Chicago, and if you look at the makeup of the industry at that

time, not the area committee, that's not a reasonable approach, because what we done, we took a representative sampling of people from each state. That wouldn't give it a relative picture, but great big companies were based outside of Chicago rather than in Chicago. And maybe there is a reason for that, but we now in the middle of January had to get out to the local unions and we decided that the way to do that was to hold meetings. And we held one, I believe, in Sioux City, one in Omaha, and all of this was nothing except a warm-up for a meeting we wanted in Chicago. And we were getting a lot of opposition. In Kansas City there were two people that were anti what we were trying to do. And one of them was O.B. Endlow and the other one was Enslinger. And they became notables later on in all kinds of skullduggery, and they're mentioned in all kinds of scandals and corruption over the years. In St. Louis, there was a fellow, Luigi Cami, Louie Cami. He was an unscrupulous little scoundrel. And in Chicago there was Henry Burger, and he was a senior organizer. And there was a loyalty or whatever, blackmail or whatever, apparatus set up with him and Tobin over the incidents in the early '30s in Chicago, and there was John Pecago, who had been put on the staff a year or two earlier and he was not going to get out of step with any of the barons. He

felt that us upstarts, kids -- Pecago was a mature man, he was 45 years old, and he wasn't about to take orders from a 25- 20-year-old punk like Farrell and I and a couple of more. He wasn't going to be subservient to us. And the committee was assuming some power. And then there was, in Cleveland, a vice president of the union, Ed Murphy. And Ed Murphy come out of that goddamned cesspool that spawned the likes of Bill Presser and a few more scoundrels. And Murphy himself had a lot of barnacles on his back.

So they were trying to sabotage the committee getting off the ground. Now they were dependent upon Tobin for their jobs. Now, Pecago and Burger were direct employees of Tobin, he could say boom and they were gone. Endlow and Enslinger had some support in the Kansas City joint council. And they proposed to be--well, they were kind of ambidextrous bastards, they allege that they were part of the--Jesus Christ, what the hell is his name now, the guy that went to jail, the big politician guy, I can't think of his name, it will come to me. And Truman, as well. They were bandying them names around.

Riehle Pendergast?

Maloney Pendergrass. They claimed that they had the support of Pendergrass and they also said they had the support of Truman.

Well, it's a known fact that Truman was pretty loyal to the Pendergrass people, they had supported him and he had supported them. And Cami, I don't know where he come from, who was behind him, but he was a vicious little son of a bitch. So they did have a little support. They had ranks that they had one time come from.

Now, running around with them, shining their shoes, was this son of a bitch, Roy Williams. He was just a punk around there at the time. I vaguely remember him, and he was trying to sign on there as some sort of a ship bum of some kind, I forget which. So there was a group of them that recognized the area committee as an impediment to navigation in their stream. Minimum rates, minimum wages, minimums and maximums would interfere with their right to chisel and wheel and to deal. They wanted a wide open shop where they could cut their own deals that way.

Now the other thing, because of the infancy in the industry, many, practically, if not all, of the trucking companies had not yet established their own terminals and their own operating base. And there's reasons for that, because, one, it takes quite a bit of money. Two, you've got to have time to assess your business and find out where it's going to be and how you're going to best serve it. And

there were companies that have not just been legitimate in a business for a couple of years, they're in an industry where there's not much venture capital around for people that don't have historical backgrounds, and the previous period so many truck operators had been buying and going broke and stuff like that that legitimate lenders are wary. So most of the companies--now there were exceptions, but most of them would engage, respectively in each local community a cartage company or a local trucking company, teaming company to do their pickup and delivery work. Now, if you've got a big, large trucking company, and if you're going to be successful, you've got to have quite a few terminals. So there's quite a bit of cash outlay involved to institute your own terminals. And the communication needs, wire, the telephones, all the things that go with it, plus the personnel, plus getting suitable grounds, you've got to figure out the traffic patterns and you may be able to get a piece of ground in one part of town but you find out that your work is in the other and you've got 2-3 hours a day that you're driving back and through the metropolitan traffic where you're just wasting your money.

So we have here now a situation where the overwhelming share of the truck lines that we're dealing with have rental space in one of the local terminals in Chicago.

Now, some of them had enough money just to rent floor space in the terminals and had enough clout to have their own truck pickup and delivery service. Most of them relied strictly on ABC cartage for their dock area and relied on ABC cartage to pick up and deliver their cargo.

Now, whether they had their own trucks or they didn't, they needed the dock space. And whether they leased it or it was on a per diem basis, instead of the long-term lease, the workers in 95% of those terminals were members of the Chicago Teamsters Union, not the IBT.

So we had to bear in mind that when we started in to organize the employers, to get them to sign the agreement, they were goddamned skittish about meeting us in negotiations. Because they were fearful that the officers of the Chicago Brotherhood of Teamsters, which had jurisdiction--now, they didn't have all the docks by far, but they had a hell of a lot of them, and they had the great majority of the local pick up and delivery drivers. The situation today, where most of the companies now own their own

land, they own their own everything, the situation is quite a bit different, but in those days the shoe was on the other foot. And they did not want to get cross ways with the Chicago truck drivers locals because they could put them out of business and they knew it. So they were fearful.

Now in addition to their own seat of the pants fear, they had in St. Louis certain Teamster officials would talk to certain officials in the PDQ Trucking Company and you tell your counterparts in Chicago that if you get tangled up with them guys there might be trouble, and there's a general atmosphere of doubt and fear. To get a person to meet with us to discuss labor relations and the Chicago team drivers find out about it, they felt Jesus Christ they'll be down there with the pipe bombs in the morning and there'd be a hole in the wall where they go through. So they didn't want to meet with us. And they were encouraged by these renegades and our opposition and Farrell describes this Teamster ~~power~~ "power", I believe, where they were not satisfied just going to trucking companies, they were in trying to poison Tobin's mind. I think it was Endlow, Burger, Murphy, and Cami, maybe some more. And they were in--and Tobin by this time had become pretty much convinced that Dobbs was telling the truth and they were inclined to be a little bit on the

x TEAMSTER POWER
by Farrell Dobbs
Path Finder Press

hokey pokey. So he called Farrell in and they were laying a story on Tobin about the area committee that wouldn't quit. He said, "Well, we'd better go to the horse's mouth." And here's Farrell, he walked in on him.

Well, that got straightened out quite a bit and they took a hike, but not very gleefully. And it opened Tobin's eyes up too. But he was suspicious of them, that's how relations change and how they change back too under different circumstances.

So we were in a difficult situation first before we even got to the fact where we wanted to send out letters addressing the employers to meet with us. We had a problem of these goddamned guys in our own union trying to shoot us down. So we had a meeting in Chicago in the early part of March and we got wind through the grapevine that Sandy was going to get the jurisdiction for all the highway drivers.

Now, as I explained earlier, because of the lack of capital for these truck lines, they would rent space in luggage and buggage and don't come now or we call you all transfer companies. There was a whole mixed bag of those people around. And some of them would belong to Local 710, some of them would belong to Local 74, some 75, someplace else. And the common shot was that where these trucks

pulled in, whatever union had control of those docks, the drivers for that company paid dues into that union. They had no contracts, it was just paying--what the hell, they were paying--what the hell's the word for it, they were just paying off.

They were paying tribute is all it amounted to, they had no contracts with them. And I'm collecting dues for a company and they're lending part of their dock is being used for PDQ Long Line Trucking and they've got 15 people working there and I tell the employer them people belong to me. So they get 15 books and they pay dues and I put the dues money in my book and when I turn it in to the union, I get a commission on the dues collected, and I get a finders fee for getting them in the union first.

Well, the theory of getting them all into one union means that all of these local unions that had 8, 10, 20, 30, 40, 100, 200 people would have to turn them over to Sandy O'Brien. And now we heard that Sandy was going to get that jurisdiction.

Now, whether or not Sandy had deep, thoroughgoing discussions with ~~Ellie~~ L.E. Murphy, who was Tobin's man in Minneapolis in the 500--in the 544 days, we don't know. Farrell makes references to it in his book. I don't know. I'm not doubting Farrell. Roads lead to Rome and chances are Murphy and O'Brien being kinfolk, more or

HEAD OF ~~DETROIT~~ CHICAGO TEAMSTERS (IBT)

less, had something in common. And Sandy, being a sharp, streetwise kind of guy would say, "Hey, what kind of guys are them?" And Murphy, after we got to know him was in a way he was as honest as people like that can be. And he probably told Sandy that "They ain't bad guys, they give their word and they keep it. They ain't out pulling no deals and they ain't out cutting your throat." That's all Sandy needed.

So prior to the meeting being held in Chicago, Burger and Pecago, well, you wait, O'Brien ain't going to go along with this scheme and if O'Brien gets the jurisdiction, he'll run the show.

Well, O'Brien knew less about running the union than he'd care to admit, because he wasn't long-term on that. Local 710 originally was a meat wagon drivers union, and George Kidd run it when they--when the union was just concerned with the packing houses. Well, when Kidd died, Sandy O'Brien moved in, he was never a packing house driver. Mike Healey was. Frank Brown, to my knowledge, never worked there. Sandy was down as business agent of the cab drivers, 777. But Sandy's ace in the hole was him and Tom Hughes were thicker than shit in the blanket. They were raised in Goose Island and they were goom bodies. So Sandy couldn't do much wrong around the International. Not with Hughes in his corner.

So Sandy fooled them all. Sandy threw his lot in with us and he never faltered. When I went to prison in July of 1940, Sandy was just as solid as he was the first day when we met him to support us. He said, "you guys have the program, you have the ID, and you've got the know how, I'm with you." That was his whole shot. He never backed away, there was never a time that Sandy didn't cooperate right down the last line and send Mike out, send anybody, any time he could help he did it. And he'd go to bat for you and he'd run interference for you. And he'd help.

And Sandy was one of the only men in the Teamster's Joint Council hierarchy that had respect with 705. And guys who wanted to work in town got a job and Local 705 had the jurisdiction, and the guy was a member of the Teamsters, IBT, and wanted to get into a local cartage, what was a 705 job. They'd transfer him into 710 and there was reciprocity between 705 and 710. Eddie Maywood, I think, was the guy at 710--at 705. And Sandy could work out trades. And when Keeshan, who became the chair for the operators for the area committee was faced with the problem, he had a big, big operation, Keeshan did, all over his system. His road drivers were in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, except Chicago. And his dock drivers, well, they were in 705. And Sandy paid the local

union 705 $30,000 because they figured that during the immediate period for so many years the business agents that serviced Keeshan's terminal would lose $30,000 in commissions. The business agents worked on commission. They had a flat salary, but they got a commission of all the dues they collected. They were always hustling. So they worked out an arrangement that Keeshan's men would go in to 710, Sandy would send the check for $30,000 to Local 705.

Riehle 705 was in the Chicago Brotherhood?

Maloney They were in the Chicago Brotherhood of Teamsters, those Chicago truck drivers.

Riehle And not in the IBT?

Maloney they were not in the IBT. And that's some of the strange things that went on.

Now, in some of the unions around Chicago, 710 as well, they used to have books, and you'd come in--you and I driving partners on a rig, and wed come in to the terminal, and the dispatcher would say, "You guys go down there to the Wilson Dock." And they'd say, "You guys have a book in the union?" "No." "Okay." They'd hand each of you a book. Then you'd go down and the guy would bump you on the dock, if you had a book, you show him. After you got unloaded

you come back to the dock and give the book to the company. And these companies would buy 10-15-20 books. That meant that the company had labor fees and they'd buy those books for so many dollars and pay dues on so many Joe Blows and the guy would get the commission

[end side A, Begin side B]

Maloney Now I think--I don't know if we were on the record for the last part of it, but it was a common practice in Chicago for the business agents and the officers, which I assume the secretary/treasurer had a cut on, as an inducement in their salary, they got a commission on the dues they collected. So I assume them places where they handed you a book to go down to unload, if you didn't have one, that the business agent handling that dock, what the commission was there was 100 cents on the dollar, because I think they never carried--those guys were goats. They'd have a hundred of them books or 500, who knew? Nobody knew, they didn't account for nobody, there was nothing on the books, they'd just write them up. So I went down to ABC Terminal and I got a book for Joe Dokes and Pete Brown and we unload and the next guy comes in and tomorrow morning another driver's got them. And at the end of the month, the business agent goes down and he says, "Well, we've got

20 men on your platform and they got to pay dues," that was the workers. "Then we got another group over here," it had to be 10 or 15 books that they had, so they accounted for the 10 or 20 that they had normally, but those others, I'm damn sure where they went, 100 cents on the dollar went in their kick. Because you can't have a membership of 500 people and have a thousand books. Where's the people? So I'm sure why it was done is just a payoff. The company paid for labor fees at the rate of $50 per book of $10 per book and a dollar a month or two or whatever the traffic would bear, and that was par for the course.

So the situation from that side of the industry was probably more mechanical. But it was enough to cause certain people in the industry to see their little side bets going down the drain. Because if everybody in the workforce had a book and everybody's getting paid, there surely is no incentive for anybody to come in and sell a particular company 10 or 20 books.

Now, there was a company in Minneapolis that had about 20 of them books that I know about, that Glendenning Trucking Company. Because I made a couple of trips for Glendenning. And the dispatcher come in and he said, "You guys got a book in the union." And the driver said--I was the second man on the rig, he

says, "No." I said, "I got a book. Don't worry about me." So I know that they had them books. I actually saw them and I made a couple of trips there and they weren't getting much money then, I don't know what the hell we were getting, we were doing our own loading and unloading and stayed with the truck, and it was 450 miles each way, 900 miles, you done the loading and unloading, we probably got $12 a trip. Based upon a little over 7 miles. Things weren't too fat. And you had to eat yourself unless you brought your own meals. And even in that time there was shaking people down. That's before Sandy O'Brien was around, that's when George Kidd was running the union. And they had flat rates, they had flat rates for the drivers, no matter how much work you did you got paid a flat rate. A trip from here to there was so much money, no matter what happened, that's what you got. No matter how long you were out or how many miles there was detoured or where you had to go, that was it. Flat rate. You could be out for a week. Well, you know what a flat rate is, as against miles and hours. So the situation with the union officials wanting to sandbag us was kind of acute at times. Now, fortunately, the guys that were serving on the committee, they were not that way with the exception--I think the only shit bum on the committee was Carl ~~Coyle~~ KEVL.

Riehle You were (inaudible)?

Maloney In Des Moines. Now, you sent me some stuff and I think it come from Sven Godfredson and in there there was some stuff from Nilson from Ottumwa. And I was secretary of the Iowa Driver's Council and Carl was the chair. And I thought it kind of strange that I didn't get more mail than I did. And I often questioned in my own mind how come the secretary of the local don't get much mail. Now it wasn't my idea to start a fracas with Carl Coyle, because Carl and I had a long time agreement, and Jack Worth and Lou Miller, that Carl Coyle was an 18 carat shit bum, and Tommy Smith. And we were going to get out of Carl Coyle everything we could get out of him and that was all. But I'm convinced now, especially after reading those letters, some of them, that Carl was telling them guys to write to him. Now, that's perfectly all right, but it's common courtesy when you're sharing a post and an office that you share the correspondence with the titled officers. Both sides of the ship should sail together. Well, our first experience with Coyle was an unsavory one. Our last experience with Coyle was very much more unsavory. And he was a person that was necessary to have on the committee because he was the officer of the union. He was the man that we had to deal with.

Now, when the Sioux Falls strike was over, I went to Sioux City and I established a beachhead there. And then Farrell asked me to go over and see if I could bust into Omaha and to Des Moines, whichever come first. I went to Des Moines first and I knew Coyle. I stayed away from him. I talked to Frannie Quinn. His brother, Leo, was the secretary/treasurer.

Riehle In Des Moines?

Maloney And he was the elected officer. Carl was a hired hand, in a way. Frannie Quinn was a member of the union and he was an organizer. They called them business agents. Joe Coyle, Carl's nephew, was also an organizer, and boy he was a tough, (inaudible) kid woo-hoo. And he didn't share Carl's ideas. So I can talk to Leo and I talked to Frannie and there was a guy there by the name of Mills, from the bakery wagon union. And he was a good guy. And we got enough feeling there that they decided to attend the meeting to join the council. Well, then I went over to Omaha and there wasn't much problem there. Lou Miller was there and Al Russell lived there. And Al Russell was a member of the Party. And he had been sent to Omaha as a member of the Socialist Party when they were in the Socialist Party to help the Socialist Party. And he got mixed up there with Harry Lux. Harry Lux is the father of Gene Lux, who was

one of the ranking senators in the state of Washington, here. He's a little uncomfortable when I remind him about it. Of course, he wants to speak with reverence about his great labor background, but he don't want to bring too much of it up.

So they come into the council and --have I sent you the documents on that? If not

Riehle On Omaha?

Maloney Yes, Omaha and Des Moines. I made them all in one swing. And so our first experience with Coyle, Carl refers to it, Farrell refers to it, was with Meadows Transfer. Now, Murphy Transfer and Storage had the contract for A&P Stores. They had a big movement. At one time, I'd worked on that A&P haul and jeez, they were tough hauls. We used to leave Minneapolis Monday morning at 7 and driving a big old white--big old sled, everything we could get on it, and it would take us pretty near all day to get to Fergus Falls, 192 miles, 2-lane highway. And we'd start working out at Fergus Falls, we'd start discharging. And then we'd go around the Fox Home and Elbow Lake and places like that. And when we'd get unloaded we'd go over to a siding and back into a carload of flour and take out about 20 ton of that and distribute that around and go back and get the other 20--they were 40-ton cars then, or case goods, one of the two.

And we'd probably get back in Minneapolis on Wednesday night, 8-9 o'clock. And out again Thursday. Keep that up through Saturday night and come in Saturday night about 6 o'clock. $18 a week (inaudible) goddamned (inaudible) we had to steal to make it. We had to steal. We'd be loading and we'd be carrying sacks down in the basement, we'd be delivering to the A&P stores and have the sugar piled up, we'd be delivering sugar and when he wasn't looking we'd take a sack off of his stock and put it on our pile and we were a sack of sugar ahead. You could always peddle a sack of sugar for $3. Well, that's as much as you made all day. And that's the way we had to get along, Dave. You get 2 or 3 of them and you could afford to eat and sleep. Otherwise, you were working for your board and room. And you could always peddle a sack of sugar. You could always peddle a couple of sacks of flour. And if you didn't do anything else, you'd manufacture some shortages if you couldn't clout (?) some. And carry something out someplace or shortchange somebody. And if you didn't you didn't have enough out of $18 to be outside the city--well, anyway, Murphy, of course, was stuck with the agreement, 52 1/2 cents an hour. And the (inaudible) that went with it.

So A&P's looking around. Meadows Transfer from Des Moines, Iowa bid the job in at the Meadows wage rate. Which was considerably less than our rate in Minneapolis. By now, the minimum wage we settled for in '34 had been increased a couple of times. Probably we were getting--let's see 52 1/2--we were probably getting 65 or 70 cents an hour, scale by now.

Well, Meadows come in and they were going to haul it at the Des Moines rate, which was considerably less than ours, 8, 10 or 12 cents an hour less. And maybe some conditions less. And when the Meadows truck shows up, we went over and we said, "That's all, fellows. You don't work, you don't load nothing." "What for?" "Well, you just don't load. Start loading and you'll see what happens. You're not coming in here and taking our work at a cheaper rate of pay, that's all, you're not going to do it."

Well, they get on the horn so we explain to the drivers, "Now, look, this ain't Chicago. We're not out trying to take your job. You're entitled to the job, we don't want your job, we've got work here. But you're not coming in here and cutting our wages. When you start loading that truck, it's going to be loaded at the same rate of pay that a Murphy driver was getting and not a goddamned penny less. And we don't give a shit who hauls it. The driver that drives the

truck is going to get our rate of pay." And this fits into the concept of the area committee thinking. We said, "We are not going to allow a trucking company from Pumpkinville or Gripster's Mill or any other place, including Des Moines, to negotiate a sweetheart contract with your local and come up here and bid on our contracts that were established at our rate of pay. And that trucking contractor's (inaudible) that kind of money. If he can make it at bidding the job in and paying you the rate we get, we don't care. But if he can't, his ass is out of the underwear, not yours." Well, when they understood that we weren't after their job and that they stood to get about 15 cents an hour more per hour, they were for us. Well, up comes Coyle. He's huffing and puffing and he's going to show these Hoosiers up there what the score is. Well, we separated him from the--the union did, rather, they separated him from that employer and said, "Now, look, if you want to talk about the union we'll talk about the union with you all day. We ain't saying shit in front of that boss. And if you're pleading his case, you can get on a train and go back with him. Pack these trucks up and tell them drivers to get in and drive them back. But you've come to the end of the line," and that's about the way he was told. "You come up here pleading poverty for a truck line to get work at our expense, you are

in the wrong part of town. We're not after your work, you can come up here and work your whole goddamned roster of men, but when you work in our area you're going to work under our wage scales and we're not going to be pirated."

Well, he finally got through that we meant business. I don't think he really accepted it. I know he didn't, now, after reading them letters where he was telling Nilson, "Go sign these up, if anything, get them under contract and later on we can raise their wages." And we're out there agitating people to get the base pay right off the beginning. So his commitment there, his letters are his own indictment, which proves what we thought about him. And here, 50 years later, we get the pudding, the proof.

Well, Coyle then became on the outside a believer and, of course, he cut himself in because this was something new and better. And we had to take him by the hand and lead him along and tell him. Now, the reason for that is that Carl Coyle was never a truck driver. Carl Coyle was an employee of the city of Des Moines, hired. He had something to do in the street maintenance department. And he got that job because he was a fixture in the local Republican political apparatus. Now, I'm not talking Republican/Democratic, I'm pointing out what his origin is. That was a notoriously Republican

state and he was some kind of a little two-bit ward healer. And he got the job that he had eventually, that he had, he was something to do in the state maintenance--or city maintenance of equipment or something. He had some kind of a little political job. And he got active in the --I don't know, I guess the union there, and it was, of course, controlled politically, and they had enough politics. So he got inflated well beyond his means. And so when the move come on after the driver's strike in Minneapolis and after the organization that people are moving in in the '36 period, the drivers in Local 90, Des Moines, wanted to organize and they were looking around somebody to do some good for them.

Well, this Coyle had this little two by four job in the city and he had this little goddamned structure of people that were in the union and I guess they thought he was a world beater, so Local 90 hired him and he was under contract as their business agent. So I don't know where his relationship was in membership in the union.

Eventually, he no doubt ~~because~~ became a member. But he had a contract for so many dollars a week and so much expense with the union. But he never was a bona fide truck driver. He didn't come out of the ranks. Leo Quinn and Frannie Quinn and Joe Coyle, his

nephew, did. They were truck drivers. But Coyle had conned them into believing that he was the great Messiah.

Now, during the over-the-road strike, we suspected Coyle--we suspected Coyle of having back-door relations with a couple of the trucking companies. Sometime I'll tell you about that. And we proved it. But we couldn't afford to tear the apparatus up because of that. We proved it to ourselves, we didn't come out and have a public denunciation, that wouldn't have been our goal either. If we'd had him we'd have told him, "Hey, pack up and go. Tell them your mother's sick in Florida and go down and take care of her." But in the strike, of course, in all the cities that were strikebound, transportation is a problem. Goods have to be transported. And you can't just stonewall the thing through. You're not that big and you're not that strong and you're not that powerful. And there's a certain amount of public support and sentiment that you want to keep. So if people have got something coming in and they want it and you deny them the chance to get it then you've got some enemies out there. And pretty soon you've got the pitchfork brigade following you around sticking you to where you lose face. So we developed a platform, like we did all the time, that any employer who was fair, wants to sign the tentative agreement, that he'll pay

what the union is asking, a dollar an hour and this, that, and the other. And that when the strike is settled he'll accept the standard agreement and work by the conditions that we permitted to cooperate. 98% of those kind of agreements, 2 weeks after the strike is over, all those contractors go broke. Everybody reverts to their previous business. But during the strike, you get over a lot of hurdles. Freight's going to be delivered and you might as well move it and get the guys paid and have a handle on it and have the police force out there and the national guard handling it under their conditions. We had that experience in Minneapolis, and that wasn't too good.

So we said anybody that wants to sign the agreement, and, of course, it breaks the back of the employer too.

Well, the strike went on for 22 weeks.

Riehle The over the road strike?

Maloney From the 9th day of September to the 22nd day--15th day of February. In some of the worst kind of weather and the worst conditions.

Riehle (inaudible)

Maloney What?

Riehle What cities did you strike?

Maloney Well, we covered by area, we covered western Iowa, everything west of Des Moines, all of Nebraska, all of South Dakota.

Riehle Anything in Minnesota?

Maloney No, we had Minnesota pretty well corked up. And most of North Dakota. We had some operations--North Dakota, Nebraska, western Iowa and all that contiguous territory into Missouri and Colorado. Anything going off like that. It went on for 22 weeks. So--and the city'd operate, so the freight was moving and there was some bootlegging done. You can't catch everything. All them white trucks running down the road no name on it, and you can't stop everyone and shake them down, you never got enough people. You'd have to have a business agent or two for every truck. And we picked out the likely ones and well we give them comeuppance now and then.

But, anyway, a lot of the guys that went to work for Bruce Motor Freight, White Lines, those regular drivers, Watson and some more, were working for these gyppos (?). The gyppos were making--they made pretty good. They were charging--they were paying the guys--I guess our demands were a buck an hour

Riehle What's a gyppo?

Maloney Some guy just coming in, you know, a gyppo contractor. He's really not long term and he's in there to gyp somebody out of something and when he can't go he's gone.

Riehle (inaudible)

Maloney They signed an agreement. They signed the (inaudible), yes, I'll sign the agreement, I'll live up to it, and they did. Well, they were in businesses and making money and they were charging people a little premium and so they were making money. The drivers were working and you didn't get much strike fund. Tobin wasn't putting out much strike fund. So when people got to eat, you've got hundreds and hundreds of people on your hands with no food, that's a hairy thing too. And Tobin wouldn't give us strike relief and so he started giving us a certain amount per week cash donation. Because he recognized it was a valid beef. But he was going to adhere to the constitution of the union. So what he done, he give us cash money, like $3500, $5000 a week, and we distributed it to the worthy people.

Now, all these drivers that had been working, making $30, $35, $25 a week and had whiskers working for these companies 10-15-18 years seniority, they knew that when the strike was over and they could return to their companies. Well, the strike was settled for 75

cents an hour, 2 3/4 cents a mile with layover provisions and guarantees for lodging and guarantees for meals and so many hours a day guaranteed when you're on the lot, breakdowns and layovers. Things that they never had before. A lot of guys were working in Coyle's local. And he was frightened of the men. He thought that he would have to sell that agreement to the men after they'd been getting a buck an hour for about 4-5 months and then taking a 2-bit an hour wage cut, that he couldn't sell it. He come to Farrell, and he said, "Farrell, I'm going to have to have some help. I just can't sell that to my men." And I was there when he come to town and he said, "I'd like to have you, Farrell, and a couple of other members of the committee there." He said, "You don't know them guys." Farrell looked at me and give me the wink and I shut up, I didn't say nothing. Farrell said, "Well, we'll be there, Carl, we'll help you." So Carl left. Things were moving pretty fast so we talked it over. Lou Miller, myself, Farrell were going to Des Moines.

So we get there. Carl had the agenda. He talked last. So I present. Lou Miller, I guess was first and I was second and then Farrell. And they Coyle. Or maybe it was Farrell and then Lou and then me and then Coyle. Whatever. Coyle never got to talk. Why these guys when we got through telling them, they were hollering, "Let's vote,

let's vote." (inaudible) they knew. And here they had a job 15 years rights on it, they weren't going to--we pointed it out, "Now you're going back to work. You're not going to get a buck an hour, you're going to get 75 cents an hour. You're not going to get 4 cents a mile, you're going to get 2 3/4." And then guys were falling all over it, because they'd been working for a cent and a half a mile or so many dollars a week and no expenses and no layover time. You get in the lot and you wait and you're on the lot 2-3 days and you get nothing. Now they have to turn your around and send you home or start paying you. Now they had to buy you a room in a hotel. Now they have to give you meal money after so many hours. They had nothing like that. And he was afraid. He never got to talk.

So finally--Farrell spoke last and we just made little cursory remarks and Farrell got up and that was the way it was arranged. Farrell was (inaudible) so we thanked the guys for staying pat and we had to make the best we could. We'd been out 22 weeks and all the men were solid behind the settlement. That's all we said. Well, Farrell started (inaudible), they couldn't wait for Farrell to get done, they wanted to vote and get back to work. They knew what (inaudible). And Coyle couldn't believe his eyes. He saw these guys and he figured they were going to scream at him and tear him apart.

He had no goddamned faith, didn't understand them. And he got up then and was going to do some barnstorming. "Well," he said, "fellas, you know, we had a hell of a fight to get what we got." They said, "never mind that, fight, we understand what it's all about. We think you fellows done good. Don't guild the lily anymore, let's go. Let's vote." That was about the way it went. And he later on, of course, was one of the guys who come in and set up office in Minneapolis, sharpened his knife and fork and proceeded to go to work on Local 544's membership. He was there, you know, one of the--Tobin's ~~students~~ (stooges). He cut us up.

By himself he couldn't do a goddamned thing. Oh, he was a big, blustery bastard when everybody was with him, but he didn't have the guts of a johnny rabbit when it come time.

In 1937, Drew Miller, Earl Carpenter, Tommy Smith, and George Raines, none of them members of the truck driver's union in Omaha, tied up the entire Watson system. Out of that, they got a one-year contract with Watson, increasing wages, job security, and so on.

In 1938, in June, the contract was out and we were endeavoring to get the employers--and I haven't completed my history of getting the employers together in Chicago, we were squaring around, trying

to get them to meet us, which is another couple-hour historical analysis. Watson and a couple of other companies decided that they were not going to renew the agreement. They were not going to take the men back and so on. So we all had to go in to Omaha. Now, there we were again--I think I explained to you earlier that our job was not to sign agreements until we could get the master agreement. What we referred to as what we hoped anyway the master agreement. And here we saw the employers, we thought anyway, they were trying to catch us off base, by provoking this thing in Omaha. Now, we didn't know if this was a scheme or if it was off the back burner, but either way it was bad to negotiate with Watson deliberately out to negotiate a contract for his system, where there was no preparation made with us in the ranks and no support and with the problem we had in Kansas City with Endlow and Enslinger. Fortunately, Watson didn't have an operation going into St. Louis. An operation in St. Louis didn't bother us, Watson wasn't in that trade. Not to any extent.

So here we would be faced with signing an agreement which we didn't want to sign. We didn't want to conclude any agreements. It's hard to believe we're in a situation where we did not want to sign agreements. Do I make my point? We didn't want a piecemeal

agreement with one local union here and there. Because that could prevent us from having a clean sweep to get a master agreement for all the unions. And now we're on the verge of getting boxed into a corner. We couldn't afford to get painted in.

So we had the situation in Omaha. So we called the committee in to the Rome Motel. Now, Omaha is right on the Missouri River. On the other side of the Missouri River is Council Bluffs, Iowa. Carl Coyle brings with him a waitress, her name was Peggy. Half the truck drivers in that part of Iowa on that transcontinental route knew her, she was a waitress in a truck stop. She was a mature woman, she wasn't a very petite gal, she was a little bit on the chunky side, a little bit over the tender age, she was probably in her late 30s. She was no Ava Gardner. And Carl brings her along into Omaha, sets her up in the hotel where the committee's meeting, in front of God and everybody. Farrell finds out about it and he says, "You go tell that dumb son of a bitch to get that gal out of here and get her over to Council Bluffs. We get a bust here and he gets pinched for the Mann Act," he said, "ain't this going to be something."

Well, I'd always been designated to do the shit work. No matter where it seemed where it goes, it comes to me. So I called Carl over

and I says, "Hey, Carl. I have something to tell you and you're not going to like it but you'd better listen for your own good." He said, "What is it?" I said, "You'd better pack Peggy up and get her over on the other side of the river. Go over there and put her up in the Chieftain, but get her the hell out of here." And he (inaudible) he was a big guy and I think he'd fight if he got up against it, I don't mean he was a pugilist, but I don't think he was a moral coward (inaudible). "Goddamn you, you son of a bitch, who are you to start preaching morals to me?" I said, "I ain't preaching morals to you. I'm just telling you. As a committee, we've got something at stake here and you've got something at stake. You get a bust here for having a woman over the state line and you'll go to prison for 3-4 years, there's scandal, your wife your family, the whole goddamned thing, and for what's more you're doing to the committee. Wouldn't it be fined?" (inaudible) and he did that. He packed her up and he never forgave me for that.

Well, about a year later, they hung the rigging on the guy from the dry cleaner's union, Al Malts, not for that but for another thing. But Coyle never liked me, from that day on. Up to then, we didn't have any problems, but he never did like me, and I think that was it. He thought I was telling him what to do. But he was a cheap son of a

bitch. But we had to have him. He had enough clout in Iowa and in Des Moines that we had to keep him. I mean, we had to use him. He was a spokesperson. You do business with the tools at hand. But he turned, I'm sure, just as soon as he could, just as quick as he could to get a job with Tobin. I suppose he told Tobin that Farrell twisted his arm and threatened him

[end tape 5]